A conversation between German political observer, head of the geopolitics department of the Berliner Zeitung Thomas Fasbender, and the famous Uzbek political scientist Qudratilla Rafiqov.

– Mr. Rafiqov, I have long wanted to write about Uzbekistan and better understand the process in this country. This country, located in the center of Eurasia, can rightfully be considered not only a geopolitical, but also a civilizational center of the continent.

In my opinion, two great eras that arose on this land in the distant past – the era of the Islamic Renaissance and the Timurid Renaissance – contributed to world culture and science, something significant not only for the peoples of the East or the Islamic world, but for the entire history of humanity. However, the land that was the cradle of powerful empires and civilizations remained in the grip of social and political upheavals for several centuries, having experienced the heavy burden of colonialism.

But my question is not about the distant past. I would like to talk about your country’s present day, about how the state and society have coped with the difficulties of recovery after gaining independence. In particular, I am interested in why the political elite and society were still dominated by a dangerous stagnation, perhaps even more profound than in the Soviet period.

Why did this happen? Even after gaining sovereignty, why did the country remain faithful to the old ideological principles for almost a quarter of a century, right up to today, when we are having this conversation? As I understand, society and the political elite still face difficulties conceptualizing and renewing their identity. What is the reason for this? How did feelings of independence, national identity, and relations between the people and the state develop after the so-called “dawn of freedom”?

One more point: why, more than a quarter of a century after gaining independence, is the characteristic “New” added to the name of the state of Uzbekistan? What was the reason for such a need?

– It is not easy to give a clear answer to this question. This complex discourse remains among the most acute, controversial, and discussed in scientific circles, especially regarding metropolises and colonies.

Although it sounds unpleasant, the truth is that a vast region located at the junction of West and East, North and South, has been perceived as a “periphery” for many years (unfortunately, some still think so today). But does it deserve such a description? Of course, this is a separate question.

Let’s not get away from your question. I don’t remember exactly, but someone said: “The history of mankind is the history of wars”. This phrase impresses me not only with its accuracy, but also with its meaningful poetry. It follows from an obvious idea: since wars and conquests are part of history, there will always be the dominant and the oppressed...

As I already mentioned, many scholars have tried to understand this part of history. Among them is the founder and theorist of postcolonial studies, a professor at Columbia University, and an American scholar of Palestinian origin (Arab Christian) Edward Wadie Said. In his most famous work, “Orientalism”, he quotes Marx from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: “They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented”. 

According to the demands of Orientalism, the East cannot speak for itself. It is not capable of presenting itself. It needs others to talk about it, to show it, that is, the help of Western science... As Said explained, Orientalism was a science aimed at reinterpreting the East and presenting it to Europe. This process can be seen as an instrument for dominant Europe’s absorption and appropriation of the East. In this case, the East turned not into an interlocutor of the West, but into a silent “other” standing nearby. 

In a broader sense, the colonial and postcolonial periods are research areas that help us understand our social and political history, as well as the current state of society. Although our region, located in the center of Eurasia, is not at the epicenter of the theme, as, for example, the Arab East, which Said writes about, it has nevertheless been “orientalized” to a significant degree. This is because, over a century and a half, our land has twice lost its independence. Moreover, others have spoken for us, introducing us to the world, and we have long remained the “silent other” in the face of the dominant forces.

Now, to answer your first question: Why did this happen?

The reasons for this can be divided into objective and subjective. Perhaps this is why many researchers claim that building a national state and nation in our region, particularly in Uzbekistan, is ongoing. One can partially agree with this opinion.

Formally, the Uzbek political nation, created in the first half of the last century, was presented to the world as a nation with history, culture, language, and other identification codes. However, this nation was never able to overcome colonial borders. Soviet ideology sought to subordinate all signs of national identity in the republics to a typical “Soviet” concept. The concept of the “Soviet man”, which reached its apogee in the 70-80s, deepened the inclusion of national societies of Central Asia in Soviet cosmopolitanism.

As you rightly noted, even almost 25 years after gaining independence, we have not been able to escape the influence of this concept. Why? Because perestroika, which began at the end of the Soviet period, as well as the socio-political changes of the 1990s, were perceived by the state as a severe threat. When the public environment pushed for rethinking political and ethnic identity, the state suppressed any manifestations of national, religious, and political sentiments. It became the only tough “player” in the socio-ideological sphere, as in Soviet times, but without ideology. 

The communist ideology, abandoned in the early 1990s, was replaced by a fear of new ideas and thoughts. A peculiar, even more conservative concept than the Soviet one was formed in society – a cautious and even fearful view of religion, national identity, and history. Its crudest form was manifested in the persistent denial of society’s connection with the Turkic and Islamic heritage.

In a country where almost 90% of the population are ethnic Uzbeks and Muslims, identity began to be reflected in the image of a citizen who implements abstract ideas, such as: “Uzbekistan is a state with a great future”. However, these ideas could not take root in society due to their utopian nature, like communist ideals, and their failure from both an ethnic and ideological point of view.

Such a peculiar conservative path of building a national state and society after gaining independence led not only to internal political isolation, but also to alienation from neighbors, as well as to economic and social protectionism, which physically isolated us and, in a sense, weakened us. The policy pursued concerning neighbors slowed down the building of a national state and nation. In conditions when life in the region was changing, the refusal to renew showed the state’s inclination to the legacy of colonial ideology.

During the first 25 years of independence, the issues of building a national state and forming a nation did not receive due attention. That is why many analysts, assessing the transition period that ended in 2016, concluded that “Mirziyoyev inherited a difficult political and economic legacy”. This opinion is quite fair.

As you said, the saddest thing is that Eurasia’s most important geopolitical point – the region’s largest and most influential country – has become isolated and cut off from the world to a certain extent. The orthodox tendency that kept Uzbekistan within the framework of the Soviet concept of the national state and nation affected not only the internal situation but also regional interaction. This tendency in the region inspired ethnic nationalism, which contributed to the alienation of the new republics from each other.

– So you want to say that after gaining independence, the region’s states began not to converge, but, on the contrary, to move away from each other?

– Yes, approximately so. The peoples of the once united region – Turkestan – had to face numerous misunderstandings after gaining independence. In some cases, grievances and discontent grew into bloody conflicts. These contradictions arose from disputes over borders, water, and ethnic superiority. However, the most challenging thing was the politicized attitude towards what states began to consider part of their national ideology. The history and cultural heritage of the region was monopolized. It was once ironically noted that the history and cultural heritage of the region turned into a language of mutual hatred.

Unfortunately, today, the five states of the region have entirely different and sometimes contradictory versions of history taught in schools, although their past is one. For a long time, the formation of the national state and nation in the region developed according to the Soviet method – through denial, opposition, and confrontation.

However, I have deviated somewhat from the topic. We discussed issues of identity, ideology, and national thinking. In my opinion, the basis of identity is language, culture, history, and historical memory. Naturally, religion also plays an important role. Considering the situation, an ideological vacuum is dangerous for society and the state. In the first years of independence, elements of individualism began to appear in Uzbekistan. The relationship between the state and society weakened: ensuring life and well-being fell to a greater extent on the shoulders of the individual.

During this period, the Soviet concept of equality disappeared, and the standard of living began to depend on each person’s abilities. Attention to traditions, language, identity, history, and national values ​​increased. All this in itself became a kind of ideology – an ideology that society created for itself.

Unfortunately, this social impulse – be it economic liberalism, individualism, or traditionalism – was not accepted, reworked, or supported. On the contrary, it was rejected. As I have already said, the political elite of that time was afraid of this process.

In the first years of independence, the state, mistrustful of a society that was searching for its own identity, actually hindered this process. National identity, an appeal to history and traditions, was perceived as a potential threat. Instead, importance was attached to Soviet humanistic concepts such as “friendship of peoples”, “internationalism” and “multinational people”, which were borrowed from the old system.

This policy was a conscious and logical step. The state tried to protect a society that was searching for itself among the ruins of a collapsed ideology from returning to historical roots, including family values ​​and ethnicity, which were perceived as a threat to “radical nationalism”. This fear, alas, became not only a permanent element of state policy, but also its distinctive feature.

A strange idea began to take root in society: We reject communist ideology, but at the same time, we do not consider it essential to turn to ethnogenesis, culture, and values ​​that could show us who we are. We are not entirely conservatives, but we are not liberals either. We exist. We are independent. We have the national emblem, a flag, and other symbols of statehood.

Is it possible to imagine such a contradictory symbiosis in society? The dichotomy that arose was challenging to understand. Are we striving for a liberal society or a conservative one? Will we live with memories of the Soviet past, or will we turn to national identity? At what stage are we now? Who are we, what place do we occupy in the region and the world, and what is essential in others’ perception of us? Are we building a national state, and how is the issue of the nation resolved?

These issues remained unanswered, creating uncertainty in society and state policy. This uncertainty fueled negative state protectionism, manifested in the economy, domestic and foreign policy, spiritual and ideological life, and everyday life.

An attempt to isolate the country from all “influences” in the context of a globalized world was absurd. However, these factors, alas, did not remain just a theory or elite discourse – they determined the socio-political life of Uzbekistan for a long time. Identity, traditions, ethnicity, nation and national state, attitudes towards historical figures – the ruling regime determined all this. Paradoxically, such a policy became an alternative to the socialist ideology, which it formally rejected.

A situation arose in which, despite the official absence of ideology, its traces were felt everywhere. These elements and other unnoticed aspects became the main reason for stagnation in public consciousness.

In my opinion, today, many who talk about the nation, national state, and identity perceive these issues from a romantic point of view. However, the most alarming thing is that these topics have not yet received scientific analysis.

What does the concept of “nation” mean in the context of modern globalization? Should a national state belong to one ethnic group or be an association of citizens of different ethnic groups? These questions remain unanswered.

The same applies to the official ideology of the state. Over its 25 years of independence, Uzbekistan has not formed clear views on this topic. The reason seems to be that a political culture was not formed during those years, and its development was not given the opportunity.

– Would you please tell us what has changed in the country and the region since 2016? Can we talk about an exit from the state of “submission” that you mentioned, referring to Said? And one more thing: you seem to have forgotten to answer the second part of my previous question – where did this unusual epithet, “New Uzbekistan”, come from in socio-political life?

– Indeed, there was a need for this expression – from both a spiritual and political point of view. Society and the state began to realize they could no longer live like this. The epithet “New Uzbekistan” became a call for mobilization, an indicator of upcoming updates.

I think it would be right to start with the circumstances in which Shavkat Mirziyoyev found himself when he assumed his duties as Head of state. This will help us better understand the essence of the changes that took place.

What was the situation at that moment?

I will say honestly, it was far from enviable. Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s rise to power coincided with a period of global, regional, and local crises. The withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, the pandemic, the consequences of the global economic crisis, regional interstate and border conflicts, socio-economic problems that have accumulated in society over many years... 

All these challenges seemed to have deliberately coincided with the beginning of Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s presidential activity. For example, you remember how things were between neighbors in the region 7-8 years ago. The events in Afghanistan, the outcome of which was uncertain, caused serious concern. In addition, the disunity of the countries in the region made even discussing a common agenda practically unattainable.

At that time, integration seemed so far away that it was pointless to talk about it. Instead, it was necessary to assume where and when the next conflict between neighbors would break out. Naturally, such instability in relations met the interests of large external players. The lack of cohesion kept the region in a state of vulnerability and stagnation.

– Let me interrupt you. Listening to your analysis, I had an idea. The term “Eurasian Balkans” often appears in international political literature. You probably know that this refers specifically to your region?

– Yes, if I’m not mistaken, this term was first used by Zbigniew Brzezinski. In his famous book “The Grand Chessboard”, he explains this in detail. Although his theses are often perceived today as political speculation, the statement is not without foundation.

Our situation did resemble the Balkans in Europe – with their political and ethnic conflicts, mutual grievances, and various contradictions. Remember, for example, Uzbekistan’s relations with its neighbors – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – at that time. Tajikistan’s Leader Emomali Rahmon had not visited Uzbekistan for almost twenty years. Relations with Kyrgyzstan, where political changes often took place, also left much to be desired.

This disunity hindered the region’s development, exacerbated conflicts, and deprived the countries of the opportunity to seek solutions to pressing problems jointly. During the first period of independence, Uzbekistan’s relations with neighboring countries, including Kyrgyzstan, were never sincere. This also applies to Kazakhstan, with which there were hidden contradictions. Such relations resembled useless disputes about leadership in the region: “Are you better?” or “Am I better?” The atmosphere was such that even the hope for unification seemed unattainable.

Shavkat Mirziyoyev was elected Head of Uzbekistan during this period of social and political depression, mistrust, and disunity.

What should have been done in such a situation? Of course, a sober assessment of the state of affairs was required and, if necessary, a willingness to “get off the horse”. Shavkat Mirziyoyev did just that. He began to actively work on restoring friendly relations with neighbors and resolving old conflicts.

The result of these efforts was the establishment of the Consultative Council of the Heads of State of Central Asia in 2018. Although this structure was semi-institutional, it became an essential platform for mutual understanding and unification of efforts after a long period of disunity. Cultural, humanitarian, economic, and political ties were restored between the region’s countries. Most importantly, a positive atmosphere was formed in the region, contributing to strengthening its status as a single international entity.

In this context, I can confidently say that Mr. Brzezinski’s predictions, which you mentioned, did not come true. Moreover, I believe that Shavkat Mirziyoyev “edited” his concept to a certain extent. Today, cooperation dominates in Central Asia instead of competition, and friendship and brotherhood are developing instead of grievances and hostility.

Let me give you a simple example. This year, we all witnessed the Summer Olympic Games held in Paris. Athletes of Uzbekistan won outstanding victories. It was especially pleasant to see how our brothers from neighboring countries sincerely welcomed our athletes who climbed the podium. Social networks were filled with comments and congratulations like: “Long live our brothers! Central Asia – the children of Turkestan – are in no way inferior to others, we are a great nation!”

Of course, this event did not go unnoticed by people interested in the history and modernity of the region, as well as by specialists. For example, the famous Russian anthropologist and researcher of Central Asia Sergey Abashin noted: “The 2024 Olympics is a landmark event. Not so much for the discussion of gender and art, but for the impressive performance of athletes from Central Asian countries, especially Uzbekistan, which won 8 gold medals and reached 13th place in the overall world standings (let me remind you that in addition to Olympic achievements, Uzbek chess players have also reached the top positions in world rankings in recent years). We are witnessing how Central Asian countries are becoming visible, recognizable, and important players in the use of the language of sports globally and are becoming aware of their subjectivity. This is a real historical shift in the world and in the former post-Soviet space, which is long-term and not at all accidental”.

In this context, another noteworthy study conducted by Kyrgyz specialists is worth mentioning. According to its data, in 2016, even before Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in Uzbekistan, most respondents in Kyrgyzstan perceived your country as one of the most unfriendly. However, just a year later, in 2017, the results of a similar survey showed a sharp turnaround: Uzbekistan was among the countries that residents of Kyrgyzstan consider to be close and friendly.

Economic statistics are also eloquent. At the end of 2016, the volume of mutual trade between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan amounted to just over $200 million. By 2022, this figure had grown several times and reached $1.3 billion.

We should not forget about the past. During the period of independence, bloody conflicts repeatedly occurred between citizens of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan amid disputes over water, borders, and ethnicity. However, today, we are seeing dramatic changes. 

An example is the statement of the President of Kyrgyzstan in an interview with Radio Liberty: “It makes no difference to us how the Uzbek side will take water that is already flowing into Uzbekistan. It does not matter whether it is by pipeline, irrigation ditch, or air. The main thing is that each action is agreed upon between the parties. From now on, the friendship between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will be strong. No one except God can spoil our friendly ties”.

These changes demonstrate that Uzbekistan has moved from a policy of isolation to strengthening friendly and constructive relations with its neighbors.

Where do you think such sincerity and decisive political will come from, both among the political elites of the countries in the region and among ordinary people?

Even these brief examples demonstrate what has happened in the region since 2016. Moreover, Uzbekistan does not have a single border dispute with its neighbors today. It has built friendly relations with neighboring states bilaterally and within various structures.

– But it is worth considering that many of these structures are traditional, such as the SCO, CIS, and CSTO, and Uzbekistan has never been a stranger to these organizations.

– I understand you. If you pay attention, in the past, processes in the political and economic structures of the region were determined mainly by external forces. The influence of their ideological and geopolitical goals was constantly felt. However, Uzbekistan’s foreign policy vectors have become more diverse in the new period.

Due to changes in Uzbek policy, formats such as consultative meetings of the heads of state of Central Asia or the “5+1” platform appeared. These updates contributed to a new practice of joint discussion and developing a common position in the region.

Today, the concept of regional identity is increasingly heard in the speeches of politicians and leaders of our countries. I consider this a historical achievement. In essence, this is a symbolic reflection of the idea of ​​Turkestan, promoted by the Jadids in the 1920s but lost.

Another essential step was Uzbekistan’s accession to the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in 2019. This event changed the organization’s agenda and raised its status. For the first time in a century, Uzbekistan officially declared it belonged to the Turkic ethnic group. This fact can also be considered the answer to your question about the “search for identity” of the state and society.

– True, most of the steps you mentioned do indeed strengthen the integration sentiment. However, as you said, there are exceptions to the concept of regional or Turkic identity. For example, Tajikistan, where Persian is spoken, does not participate in the OTS. Why?

– This is indeed a relevant question. The reasons are known. Of course, shared history and culture are an essential basis for integration. However, the organization’s members understand that in the modern global world, activities cannot be built solely on ethnic grounds or narrow nationalism.

Look at the map. The Turkic world and the region’s countries are located in the central zone of Eurasia. Our ancestors historically played the role of a link between peoples and states. The Great Silk Road passed through these lands, connecting Western Europe with China and the North with the South. Tajikistan is undoubtedly a part of this heritage.

Although Tajikistan’s Persian language is inextricably linked to the region’s peoples in a cultural and historical sense. Moreover, regarding cultural and spiritual heritage and values, including religious motives, Tajikistan is closer to us than Iran.

If we discuss the basis for membership, it is worth remembering that Hungary, which actively participates in the OTS activities as an observer, speaks the language of the Finno-Ugric group, not Turkic. 

I am confident that, at least as an observer, Tajikistan’s invitation to the Organization will only strengthen regional solidarity. Of course, this is my personal opinion.

– Doesn’t Afghanistan, Uzbekistan’s southern neighbor, with its geographical location, ethnic and cultural components, have the right to participate in the regional process?

– Of course, Afghanistan is part of the region by modern geopolitical standards. In addition to its geographical affiliation, this country is home to a large Turkic population. Moreover, a certain part of this country (northern Afghanistan) was historically called South Turkestan. From this point of view, as well as for determining the multi-vector foreign policy of the region, the southern neighbor is significant, since its territories are crossed by routes leading us to global seaports.

I think I have spoken about the region in sufficient detail. If you allow me, I will move on to changes in Uzbekistan’s social, political, and cultural life. After all, these changes reveal the essence of the epithet “New” in the name of the country, which you have mentioned more than once.

First of all, it is worth noting that after 2016, the political rhetoric of Uzbekistan has changed. This was the beginning of what I call the awareness of one’s own identity, the search for one’s “I”. Think about it: the state has all the attributes that confirm its sovereignty – a flag, an emblem, an anthem, currency, an army, borders. But, beyond that, there was always a sense of incompleteness.

Imagine that you have everything, but it is not enough. This was the case with us. This suppressed atmosphere, in its essence, resembled Said’s theory (Orientalism). Yes, Uzbekistan as a state had everything except a national identity. It lacked its soul – the very identity that was torn out of it more than a century ago. Without it, the country felt insecure and vulnerable.

Now I understand the cry of the soul of our great poet, Jadid, and victim of Stalin’s repressions Abdurauf Fitrat: “Oh great Turan, land of lions, what happened to you?..” He cried out in despair to his homeland and his people, regretting their lost hearts. A nation without its soul or identity – does it remain independent or become “other” among masters? That is why I mentioned Said and his theory of “Orientalism” from the very beginning.

In my opinion, Shavkat Mirziyoyev was deeply aware of this problem from the very beginning. Having become President, he raised issues that had not been discussed for 25 years of independence and were sometimes even taboo.

An example is the quotes from Bilge Qaghan’s inscriptions, which began to sound in political texts. At the celebrations of Independence Day, the poem “Guzal Turkiston” (Beautiful Turkestan), taboo since the moment it was written, was read. Fitrat’s name began to sound more and more often. Hundreds of national figures repressed during the Soviet era, including members of the national movement, previously called “Basmachi”, were rehabilitated by the Supreme Court.

An international conference dedicated to the scientific heritage of the Jadids was held in Tashkent. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev addressed the UN in the Uzbek language for the first time in the history of Uzbekistan.

The country lifted bans on religious, political and freedom of speech. “Blacklists” were abolished. The use of forced labor, including child labor, in the cotton industry, which had spoiled the country’s image for many years, was stopped. The Jaslyk prison in Karakalpakstan, which had become a symbol of political and religious repression, was closed.

These steps rightly distinguish today’s Uzbekistan from its past. From an academic point of view, these changes can be characterized as the state’s and society’s desire for national identity, a departure from colonial and neocolonial pressure. 

In my opinion, during Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s era, significant work was carried out to renew society and abandon Soviet systems. Let me give you another example that has important socio-political significance.

In Soviet times, as in all capitals of the Union republics, Tashkent had a central square – “Lenin Square”. A monument to the “leader of the world proletariat” stood there. After gaining independence, Lenin’s bronze figure was removed, but the square remained almost the same. A globe appeared in place of the pedestal, with the word “Uzbekistan” written in a barely noticeable font in the center. The square was renamed, with Lenin’s name removed and the word “independence” added. This is how “Independence Square” appeared.

As one can understand, the meaning of independence was reduced to only this symbolic change.

Under the new conditions, this matter was approached more deeply and seriously. Without denying the significance of this square, the New Uzbekistan Park was created in the eastern part of the capital.

Some wondered, “Why another complex if we already have Independence Square?” This misunderstanding is due to a lack of understanding of the very essence of the idea. 

As I have already mentioned, Independence Square appeared on the site of the former Lenin Square. Its architectural appearance and artistic design remained without any clearly expressed national specificity. This space, in terms of content, was extremely limited. In the center of the square stood a globe with the inscription “Uzbekistan”, symbolizing the emergence of a new state. However, it seems that this symbol expressed not so much independence as modesty and caution in its demonstration.

However, with a thousand-year history, our people’s national identity is not limited to the period of dependence. We have a glorious past, great heroes, and outstanding achievements in science and culture that the people of the world admire.

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev conceived the park project based on these very motives. Today, with its majestic monument, the New Uzbekistan Park is where guests and tourists from all over the world, as well as politicians and government leaders, come. Its exhibitions cover not only the history of our country but also the common heritage of the entire region.

Defining regional identity and understanding how people in this region perceive themselves and their place in the world play a huge role. From this point of view, the rapprochement that is taking place today, not only in the economic and political but also in the cultural and humanitarian spheres, is paramount for mutual understanding between peoples who have lived side by side for centuries.

Due to their content and significance, projects such as the New Uzbekistan Park can become a point of unification of the history of the region’s peoples. Such large-scale ideas are sorely needed today.

I think none of your questions remained unanswered.

– Thank you! I have one more question. Everyone sees that the geopolitical situation around Central Asia is changing today. This also means the emergence of new actors in the region. Naturally, such a situation can create certain inconveniences for the domestic and foreign policies of the two locomotive states – Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. For example, one force can exert pressure, pursuing economic interests, while the other can strive to maintain these countries as a geopolitical object from an ideological or political point of view. What do you think, if such pressure is exerted on Uzbekistan, what position can the current government – President Mirziyoyev – take? 

– A very interesting question. It seems that the President foresaw such questions since, in his speeches, he repeatedly gave a clear and concise answer to this issue. For example, on December 22, 2023, at a meeting of the Republican Council for Spirituality and Enlightenment, Shavkat Mirziyoyev said: “We are all witnessing how powerful centers of the world, which previously defended their goals and interests mainly through diplomacy and politics, have now openly embarked on the path of pressure, confrontation, and clashes. Unfortunately, the influence of such large-scale and extremely contradictory processes does not bypass the Central Asian region and our country, which is an integral part of it”.

That same year, at a meeting in Surkhandarya region, the President answered directly related to your question. The Head of state said: “These are challenging times. Large countries are now saying: “Uzbekistan, whose side are you on? Stop being neutral. Join this side or that side”. They say this quite persistently... And they say it, and their representatives also call for this, stating: “We need Uzbekistan in Central Asia. The population of which has reached 36 million people, and in three or four years, it will be 40 million”. They ask: “Whose side are you on?” How should one answer such a difficult question? There is only one answer – I am only on one side, I am ready to die for my nation, people, the interests of the great future of Uzbekistan”.

Is it possible to give a clearer and more precise answer to your question?

– Thank you. Frankly, I enjoyed our conversation very much. I learned a lot about the country that interests me, its past and present. I especially liked your thoughts about the “lost soul”. Indeed, I had never thought before that the loss of the soul was a direct manifestation of spiritual dependence and slavery. From what I heard, I concluded that today Uzbekistan is finding its identity, its “I” or, as you put it, its “soul”. I think I understood your thoughts correctly. 

– Yes, absolutely right! Thank you very much again!

UzA